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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. CONSTITUTION, SIXTH AMENDMENT:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
. . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 609:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from
him or established by public record during
cross-examination but only if the crime:
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or
(2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.

iv.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1.

Was Mr. Harper denied effective assistance of counsel

when his lawyer failed to make certain objections at trial?

v.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a
criminal action may take an appeal from a final judgment of
conviction and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. $78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as
amended) wherein this Court has appellate jurisdiction over appeals
from district court criminal cases other than first degree felonies
or capital convictions.

Mr. Harper was convicted of aggravated

assault, a third degree felony in the ThircP Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, in a bench trial before the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, presiding.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is Mr. Harper's appeal froty his bench trial and
subsequent conviction on aggravated assault, a third degree felony,
held before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, presiding.

vi.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TH^l STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Cise No. 860281-CA

BOYD D. HARPER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appeal from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated
Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-103 (1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
—

•

•

•

•

-

Boyd Harper and his wife Linda ^arper had a stormy
relationship for several years before December 11, 1984, the date of
the incident in question.

Ms. Harper had apparently started divorce

proceedings three years earlier, but "out bf fear" had reunited with
Mr. Harper (T. 25). Again in December 1983 she left him for the
period of a few weeks (T. 16). The precipitating factor in the
present case seemed to be yet another request by Ms. Harper for a
divorce on December 11, 1984 (T. 12, 15).
On the date of the incident, Ms, Harper was home
babysitting her grandchildren.

Mr. Harper was home because of a

seasonal lay-off (T. 14). Ms. Harper's brother and several other
visitors were present. At the time of the incident, both Mr. and

Ms. Harper and their visitors had been drinking (T. 35).
Apparently, Ms. Harper left the residence and returned at about noon
with a case of beer (T. 128). About half an hour later, despite her
indication Mr. Harper was fine when he was sober but becomes a
"Jekyll and Hyde when he drinks" (T. 17), she brought beer out to
him and wanted to know if he would join her in drinking (T. 129).
About four cases of beer were consumed by the Harpers and their six
visitors during the afternoon (T. 129). She figured she might have
been drunk at the time of the assault because "we drank all
afternoon"

(T. 35). She also indicated others who were present

before she and Mr. Harper started arguing were all "fairly drunk."
(T. 36).

After the visitors left, the two argued about divorce and

related issues (T. 18, 36, 47). Ms. Harper indicated she probably
provoked Mr. Harper during the argument (T. 20, 37), and may have
insulted him as well (T. 47).
Mr. Harper testified he hit Ms. Harper once or maybe
twice, but he never intended to hit her (T. 131). He wanted to
leave the residence to let her cool down because he was "about
three-quarters drunk."

Id.

Although she called him names, he just

tried to ignore her and "let her get done babbling."

Id.

When he

was walking past her to leave, she made a derogatory remark about
his little brother (who is retarded) and he, without realizing it,
just turned around and hit her (T. 132, 153). He testified he gave
no thought to hitting her before he did it but rather was thinking
of leaving and letting her cool down.

Id.

Likewise, he did not

want to hurt her but only intended to "make her shut her mouth for a
little while."

(T. 134-35, 162). He wanted to wait until the next
- 2 -

morning to see if she still wanted the divorce so they could talk it
over "instead of hollerfing] at each other.11

Id.

When Ms. Harper was in the bathroom washing blood from
her face, Mr. Harper left. He testified she was still calling him
names as he left (T. 134). He figured she only had a bloody nose
which would stop bleeding in a few minutes, or by the time her
brother arrived.

Mr. Harper did not call for help on the date in

question because he believed there was no need to. He stated "I
didn't know she was hurt.
call the police over."

Normally a blood[y] nose is not enough to

(T. 148).

According to Ms. Harper, Mr. Hamper apparently hung up
the phone as Ms. Harper was talking to her nephew following their
arguments.

Ms. Harper testified Boyd Harper then hit her twice with

his fists (T. 19, 21, 41). Ms. Harper indicated to her physician
she may have been kicked in the face, a statement inconsistent with
her later statements at trial (T. 91). At trial she said she
remembered being hit with a fist and said nothing about being kicked
(T. 21). Although she was in the hospital for nine days following
the incident, the treating physician indicated she was hospitalized
primarily for neurological observations and to allow for her
swelling to reduce before undergoing plastic surgery (T. 96, 102-03).
Mr. Harper also indicated Ms. Harper had a history of
excessive drinking.

He had taken her to the hospital on other

occasions because she would at times regurgitate blood following her
consumption of beer, whiskey or wine (T. 135, 147). Lori Mcclusky,
the victim's daughter testified her mother throws up "a great amount
of blood" "every day" when she drinks whiskey due to her ulcer
- 3 -

(T. 63). On at least one prior occasion Mr. Harper had tried to
take her to the hospital but she "wouldn't let them work on her."
(T. 147).
Dr. Bradd Christensen testified he treated Linda Harper
on December 11, 1984 after she had been assaulted (T. 89-90).
Although Ms. Harper testified she did not remember waking up until
5:00 a.m. the next morning, (T. 21) the doctor indicated she was
conscious when he first examined her in the emergency room (T. 90).
Although Ms. Harper was initially uncooperative, she did finally
allow the physician to examine her (T. 92).
Physical examination revealed Ms. Harper had a fracture
of her cheekbone or zygoma (T. 93) as well as a comminuted fracture
(broken into many pieces) of her nose (T. 92, 93). Ms. Harper
complained of shoulder pain, but x-rays of the area proved normal.
Id.

The doctor testified Ms. Harper remained neurologically intact

and "she developed no indications of serious injury to her head or
spinal cord" (T. 95) .
The surgeon testified at trial he would like to perform
additional surgery on Ms. Harper to completely restore her airway on
the left side of her nose and to correct the depression of her nose
which she now has (T. 97). The cheekbone or zygoma had healed and
did not need any corrective surgery.

Id.

Both the dimpling of her

cheek and the interference with her facial animation similarly
corrected spontaneously (T. 100). The doctor testified he thought
any injury to the face of a woman could be considered serious
disfigurement (T. 109). The doctor indicated the irregularities he
observed on Ms. Harper's nose, though obvious to him because of his
- 4
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expertise might not have been apparent to the "man on the street"
(T. 111). The doctor had never seen either Ms, Harper nor a picture
of her before he treated her and he therefore could not state with
accuracy whether her outward appearance had changed (T. 110), The
doctor could not testify with accuracy as to whether Ms. Harper
would suffer a "permanent abnormality" until after her next surgery
(T. 114).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In critical areas, Mr. Harper's defense counsel failed to
act effectively.

This lack of adequate representation denied Mr.

Harper his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

MR. HARPER WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In the case at bar, defense counsel failed to make a
motion in limine to exclude Mr. Harper's prior convictions, and
additionally failed to object to their admission at trial. During
cross-examination of Mr. Harper, the prosecutor elicited damaging
responses which the judge relied upon in his finding Mr. Harper
guilty.

(T. 136-37, Ruling at 7 ) . It is also apparent from the

prosecutor's questions she was fishing for admissions of convictions
and in so doing, took advantage of defense counsel's failure to
object.

It is also obvious from the transcript, Mr. Harper had been

inadequately prepared by his lawyer regarding how he should answer
such questions.

The relevant portion of the testimony follows:

- 5 -

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS, BEARNSON:
Q.

Do you have any prior felony convictions?

A*

Yes.

Q.

What prior felony convictions do you have?

A.

One theft.

Q.

And when was that?

A.

1980.

Q.

isn't it true that you have two prior felony

theft convictions?
A.

No. it is not true.

Q.

Were you not convicted of a felony theft in 1979?

A.

No, I wasn't.

Q.

in the Third District Court?

A.

No, I wasn't.

Q.

Have you ever been convicted of a misdemeanor

involving dishonesty, or false statement?
A. Yes.
Q.

What misdemeanor were you convicted of?

A.

Class A misdemeanor.

Q.

in what year?

A.

'79.

Q.

So a Class A misdemeanor theft in 1979, and a

second-degree felony theft in 1980?
A. No.
Q.

Pardon me?

A.

No.

- 6
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Q.

Okay.

Then what?

A.

A third-degree felony.

Q.

In 1980?

A. Yes.
Q.

Do you have any other convictions for

misdemeanors involving dishonesty, or false
statement?
A.

What do you mean?

Q.

involving a lie or deceit?

A.

Not that I know of.

(T. 136-37).
In his ruling finding Mr. Harper guilty of aggravated
assault the judge stated, "I choose not to believe the statements o
the Defendant . . . for a number of reasons. . . . And I think his
credibility for truth and veracity is somewhat impaired because of
his prior criminal record."

(Ruling at 7)^

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2054, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984), th
Supreme Court announced a two prong test to determine whether
counsel was functioning in such a fashion as to deprive the accused
of his sixth amendment right to counsel.

The Court stated

ff

[t]he

Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel
because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to
the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results." Id
at 685. Therefore, the Court reasoned, "the right to counsel is th
right to effective assistance of counsel."

Id.

The test announced in Strickland requires first that the
defendant show counsel's performance was deficient.

Errors under

this prong must be "so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Secondly, the defendant must show "the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense."

Id.

This Court, in the recent decision of State v. Morehouse,
73 Utah Adv. Rep. 114 (reh'g denied February 1, 1988) affirmed Mr.
Morehouse's conviction despite his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel and in so doing relied on the Strickland v. Washington
standard,

in Morehouse, this Court followed the rationale of State

v. Archuleta, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1987).

The Utah Supreme

Court in Archuleta indicated it would only consider whether the
complained of conduct fell below the required standard of objective
reasonableness if the person asserting the claim could first show
the conduct prejudiced his case.

Id. at 16. Confidence in the

outcome of the trial must be undermined by the ineffective counsel.
Id. at 17.
In Morehouse, defense counsel advised his client not to
testify based on his "erroneous belief that the rules of evidence
would allow the defendant to be impeached on cross-examination by
the introduction of all his previous criminal convictions.

. . ."

Morehouse, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 116, Jackson, J. dissenting.

Mr.

Morehouse's trial attorney later realized he erred by not filing a
pretrial motion to limit the use of any prior convictions for
impeachment purposes under the rationale of State v. Banner, 717
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1985).

Morehouse, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 117.

A,

THE CONDUCT OF MR. HARPER'S COUNSEL
PREJUDICED HIS CASE.

State v. Banner clarified the standard for use of prior
felony convictions for impeachment purposes.

In so doing, it

abandoned the standard previously followed which had been set forth
in Utah Code Ann. §78-24-9 (1953 as amended) which required a
witness to admit to his previous felony convictions. Banner
analyzed Rule 609(a) Utah R. Evid., effective September 1, 1985, and
indicated the Rule superseded the statute.

Rule 609(a) provides in

part:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public record during
cross-examination but only if the crime:
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted, and the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or
(2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
In the present case, because there was no pretrial
motion, there was never a determination of whether the probative
value of any of Mr. Harper's convictions outweighed its prejudicial
effect as required by State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334. Because
the judge found Mr. Harper's credibility for truth and veracity was
impaired because of his record, there can be no doubt the admissions
had a prejudicial effect.
Furthermore, there is likewise no showing that any
conviction Mr. Harper might have had for theft was necessarily one
involving dishonesty or false/statement under Rule 609(a)(2).

As

noted by Judge Jackson in his dissenting opinion in Morehouse, 73

Utah Adv. Rep. at 118-19, n.2, federal courts (which we must look to
for interpretations of the Rules) are not in agreement on exactly
what constitutes "dishonesty or false statement" within the Rule.
The testimony should not have been allowed absent some showing by
the prosecution Mr. Harper's theft conviction involved deceit or an
indication bearing on his propensity to testify truthfully.

Mr.

Harper would urge this Court to adopt an interpretation of the Rule
which would exclude the theft conviction.

I_d. citing United States

v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Finally, Mr. Harper relies on State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d
768 (Utah 1986) to show he was prejudiced by his trial attorney's
conduct.

In Peterson, the defendant testified he had three prior

felony convictions all of which were burglaries.

However, on

cross-examination, the prosecutor in Peterson asked, "Are you sure
they're [sic] only three?"
one in 1978 in Spokane?"

He also asked, "Was there not another

Id. at 769. As in the case at bar, the

prosecutor in Peterson did nothing to verify the alleged convictions
and did not offer a rap sheet for introduction into evidence.

In

Peterson, the Court found the trial court erred in not granting a
mistrial on the issue.1

The Court recognized Peterson's concern

that the prosecutor's inferences would cause the jury to doubt his
denial of the charge and seriously undermine his credibility.

1 Although the Court found the error was prejudicial, it nonetheless
affirmed the conviction because it could not find absent the
prosecutorial misconduct there was a reasonable likelihood of a
different result.
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In the case at bar, the prosecutor's questions should
have been objected to unless it was known by counsel the prosecutor
had some reliable documentation of any of his convictions. Under
Rule 609, Mr. Harper may not have been required to answer he had any
convictions.

Because the judge relied at least in part on those

convictions in assessing the evidence, Mr. Harper clearly suffered
prejudice due to his ineffective counsel.
B.

MR. HARPER'S COUNSEL'S CONDUCT FELL BELOW THE
REQUIRED STANDARD OF OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS.

As indicated, trial counsel failed to make a pre-trial
motion to limine to exclude the admission of Mr. Harper's prior
convictions.

Rule 609 and State v. Banner require defense lawyer to

make such motions in the interest of adequately representing their
clients.

Additionally, Mr. Harper cites to several other examples

where his trial lawyer failed to object to damaging evidence. For
example, the prosecutor laid minimal foundation for the introduction
of six photographs.

All were admitted without objection (T. 80).

Some appeared to be photographs of virtually the same thing and the
probative value of some was never questioned in relation to their
prejudicial effect as should have been done under Rule 403, Utah R.
Evidence.
During the medical testimony regarding examination and
treatment of the victim, defense counsel failed to object to
non-responsive answers which were prejudicial to Mr. Harper (T.
80).

Under Rule 611, Utah R. Evid., defense counsel should have

objected to the damaging answer which, under the prosecutor's line
of questioning probably never would have come in but for counsel's
deficient performance.

- 11 -

Defense counsel also failed to object under Rule 703 to a
hypothetical question posed to the doctor which included a fact
which was not within the doctor's knowledge and which had not been
introduced into evidence.2 (T. 98).
Additionally, defense counsel asked several questions
which were either damaging in and of themselves or elicited damaging
answers, all of which could have been avoided by reasonably
competent counsel.

(T. 103-06, 112-114, 116-19).

When Mr. Harper was attempting to indicate he could not
testify regarding the photographs because he was not there when they
were taken, his lawyer, rather than assist him, allowed the
prosecutor to badger him into making damaging admissions (T. 151).
Finally, the court indicated concern regarding the issue
of provocation in the case before him.

To Mr. Harper's detriment,

his lawyer never addressed the court's concern nor did he seem to
explore this as a possible defense (T. 194). Clearly, Mr. Harper's
counsel's performance fell below an acceptable limit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Harper's case was clearly
prejudiced by the actions and failures of his trial counsel. But
for his lawyer's conduct which fell below any objective reasonable
standard, the outcome would probably have been different.

Therefore

2 The doctor's response was based upon indication of a loss of
consciousness, yet all who saw or heard Ms. Harper indicated there
was not a loss of consciousness. (T. 53, 56, 68, 76-77, 91, 148,
157). The memory loss Ms. Harper described (T. 21) is different
from a loss of consciousness, and does not carry the medical
significance of a loss of consciousness.
- 12 -

his conviction ought to be reversed and his case ought to be
remanded for a new trial.
DATED this

/ /

^^fi^_
day of February, 1988.

KHRIS HARROLD
Attorney for Defendant

Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, ELIZABETH BOWMAN, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230
South 500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and four
copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114, this

f/

day of February, 1988.

, / /

DELIVERED by

?

^

this

February, 1988.
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ADDENDUM A

76-5-103.

Aggravated Assault.—(1)

A person commits

aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in section
76-5-102 and:
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the third degree.
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